Hume, Empiricism and the Generality of Thought.
Hume sought to analyse our propositionally-structured thought in terms of our ultimate awareness of nothing but objects, sensory impressions or their imagistic copies, “ideas.” The ideas of space and time are often regarded as exceptions to his Copy Theory of impressions and ideas. On grounds strict...
| Publicado en: | Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 233 - 271 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Jun2013
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=91589719&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 91589719 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00122173 GQG jtl: Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review issn: 00122173 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2013 vid: 52 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 91589719 10.1017/S0012217313000279 ppf: 233 ppct: 38 formats: tig: atl: Hume, Empiricism and the Generality of Thought. aug: au: WESTPHAL, KENNETH R. affil: University of East Anglia, Norwich su: Empiricism Thought & thinking Awareness Spacetime Idea (Philosophy) sug: subj: Empiricism Thought & thinking Awareness Spacetime Idea (Philosophy) ab: Hume sought to analyse our propositionally-structured thought in terms of our ultimate awareness of nothing but objects, sensory impressions or their imagistic copies, “ideas.” The ideas of space and time are often regarded as exceptions to his Copy Theory of impressions and ideas. On grounds strictly internal to Hume’s Treatise, I argue that they are instead typical of Hume’s account of the generality of thought. This ultimately reveals the limits of the Copy Theory and of Concept Empiricism. The key is to recognise how very capacious is our (Humean) imaginative capacity to associate particular perceptions by various fine-grained determinable resemblances. Hume a cherché à analyser notre pensée, structurée de manière propositionnelle, dans les termes de notre conscience ultime des seuls objets et impressions sensorielles ou de leurs copies imaginaires, les «idées». Les idées d’espace et de temps sont souvent considérées comme des exceptions à sa théorie des impressions et idées considérées comme des copies. Je soutiens ici que, pour des raisons strictement internes au Traité de Hume, elles sont au contraire typiques de la manière dont Hume explique la généralité de la pensée. Ceci me mènera à révéler les limites de la théorie de la copie et de la théorie empiriste du concept. Le point décisif consiste à reconnaître à quel point est vaste notre capacité imaginative (humienne) à associer des perceptions particulières à diverses ressemblances fines et déterminables. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|