Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?
Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been cen...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 190; no. 17; pp. 3579 - 3611 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=92013605&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 92013605 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2013 vid: 190 iid: 17 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 92013605 10.1007/s11229-012-0211-y ppf: 3579 ppct: 32 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 361KB tig: atl: Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others? aug: au: Corner, Adam Hahn, Ulrike affil: School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Tower Building, Park Place Cardiff, CF10 3AT, UK Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London, WC1E 7HX, UK su: Bayesian analysis Reasoning Debate Probability theory Decision making Judgment (Psychology) sug: subj: Bayesian analysis Reasoning Debate Probability theory Decision making Judgment (Psychology) keyword: Argumentation Bayesian probability Norms ab: Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this topic. In the current paper, we ask what makes something a norm, with consideration both of norms in general and a specific example: norms for informal argumentation. We conclude that it is both possible and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument, and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative principles with which to do so. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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