Endurantism and Paradox.
Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe ( 2003 ) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 41; no. 4; pp. 1173 - 1180 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=92704697&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 92704697 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2013 vid: 41 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 92704697 10.1007/s11406-013-9463-0 ppf: 1173 ppct: 7 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 109KB tig: atl: Endurantism and Paradox. aug: au: Daniels, Paul R. affil: Philosophy Department; School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia su: Whole & parts (Philosophy) Presentism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Categories (Philosophy) Intrinsic motivation sug: subj: Whole & parts (Philosophy) Presentism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Categories (Philosophy) Intrinsic motivation keyword: Endurantism Eternalism Mereology Multi-location Presentism ab: Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe ( 2003 ) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued ( 2005 ) that the objections raised by McDaniel ( 2003 ) and Beebee and Rush ( 2003 ) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, to prior analyses. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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