The Concept of Causation in Biology.
This paper sets out to analyze how causation works by focusing on biology, as represented by epidemiology and by scientific information on how the body works ('physiology'). It starts by exploring the specificity of evolved physiological systems, in which evolutionary, developmental and proximal cau...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 78; pp. 179 - 198 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Dec2013 Supplement 2
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=93503267&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 93503267 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2013 Supplement 2 vid: 78 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 93503267 10.1007/s10670-013-9508-6 ppf: 179 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 195KB tig: atl: The Concept of Causation in Biology. aug: au: Joffe, Michael affil: Imperial College London, London UK su: Causation (Philosophy) Philosophy of biology Mechanism (Philosophy) Epidemiology Difference (Philosophy) Ontology sug: subj: Causation (Philosophy) Philosophy of biology Mechanism (Philosophy) Epidemiology Difference (Philosophy) Ontology ab: This paper sets out to analyze how causation works by focusing on biology, as represented by epidemiology and by scientific information on how the body works ('physiology'). It starts by exploring the specificity of evolved physiological systems, in which evolutionary, developmental and proximal causes all fit together, and the concept of function is meaningful; in contrast, this structure does not apply in epidemiology (or outside biology). Using these two contrasting branches of biology, I examine the role both of mechanism and of difference making in causation. I find that causation necessarily involves both mechanism and difference making, and that they play complementary roles. Both are seen as ontologically necessary, even if the evidence is not always available for both. Influential monist accounts that focus on one of these, at the expense of ignoring the other, are found to be inadequate on these and on other grounds. Recent attempts to combine them are reviewed, notably that of Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21:157-170, ), and it is argued that their epistemic view requires there to be a source of the different types of evidence that a rational agent would consider, and that this source must be ontic. I then analyze how causal relationships work in evolved physiological systems and in those studied by epidemiology, with a particular focus on how mechanism interacts with input. Finally, I consider this concept of causation from the perspective of everyday language, and of its possible generalisability outside biology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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