Reference, Understanding, and Communication.
Brian Loar [1976] observed that, even in the simplest of cases, such as an utterance of (1): ‘He is a stockbroker’, a speaker's audience might misunderstand her utterance even if they correctly identify the referent of the relevant singular term, and understand what is being predicated of it. Numero...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 92; no. 1; pp. 55 - 71 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=93877653&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 93877653 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2014 vid: 92 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 93877653 10.1080/00048402.2013.788526 ppf: 55 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 118KB tig: atl: Reference, Understanding, and Communication. aug: au: Buchanan, Ray affil: University of Texas at Austin su: Reference (Linguistics) Loar, Brian Interpersonal communication Communications research Pragmatics sug: subj: Reference (Linguistics) Loar, Brian Interpersonal communication Communications research Pragmatics keyword: communication content pragmatics reference ab: Brian Loar [1976] observed that, even in the simplest of cases, such as an utterance of (1): ‘He is a stockbroker’, a speaker's audience might misunderstand her utterance even if they correctly identify the referent of the relevant singular term, and understand what is being predicated of it. Numerous theorists, including Bezuidenhout [1997], Heck [1995], Paul [1999], and Récanati [1993, 1995], have used Loar's observation to argue against direct reference accounts of assertoric content and communication, maintaining that, even in these simple cases, the propositional contribution of a referring expression must be more than just its referent. I argue here that, while Loar's observation is correct, the conclusion he and others have sought to draw from it simply does not follow. Rather, his observation helps to remind us of an important Gricean insight into the nature of communicative acts—including acts of speaker-reference—namely, that there is more to understanding a communicative act than merely entertaining what a speaker is intending to communicate thereby. Once we remember this insight, we see that the phenomenon to which Loar is calling our attention should actually beexpectedgiven the direct reference theorist's assumptions, together with independently plausible Gricean principles concerning how we make our referential intentions manifest in communication. More generally, the Gricean strategy for explaining the challenge posed by Loar cases suggests a novel way to account for certain crucial anti-direct reference intuitions—one requiring no modification of the original theory (e.g., no invocation of ‘descriptive enrichments’ as in Soames [2002]), thereby allowing for a direct reference account ofwhat is assertedin utterances of ‘simple sentences’ such as (1). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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