The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence.
Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist p...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 1; pp. 19 - 45 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Feb2014
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=94378263&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 94378263 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2014 vid: 79 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 94378263 10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x ppf: 19 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 256KB tig: atl: The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence. aug: au: Coleman, Sam affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB UK su: Panpsychism Motivation (Psychology) Consciousness Subjectivity Seriousness (Attitude) Neutral monism sug: subj: Panpsychism Motivation (Psychology) Consciousness Subjectivity Seriousness (Attitude) Neutral monism ab: Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to whom these properties belong. However, it is impossible to explain the generation of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, as I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world's ultimate material constituents are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of giving up her explanatory ambitions, or of giving up the claim that the ultimates are subjects. I argue that the latter option is preferable, leading to neutral monism, on which phenomenal qualities are irreducible but subjects are reducible. So panpsychists should be neutral monists. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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