Almost- Ontology: Why Epistemicism Cannot Help Us Avoid Unrestricted Composition or Diachronic Plenitude.
That any filled location of spacetime contains a persisting thing has been defended based on the 'argument from vagueness.' It is often assumed that since the epistemicist account of vagueness blocks the argument from vagueness it facilitates a conservative ontology without gerrymandered objects. It...
| Published in: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 95; no. 1; pp. 130 - 140 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2014
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | That any filled location of spacetime contains a persisting thing has been defended based on the 'argument from vagueness.' It is often assumed that since the epistemicist account of vagueness blocks the argument from vagueness it facilitates a conservative ontology without gerrymandered objects. It doesn't. The epistemic vagueness of ordinary object predicates such as 'bicycle' requires that objects that can be described as almost-but-not-quite-bicycle exist even though they fall outside the predicate's sharp extension. Since the predicates that begin with 'almost' are vague as well, epistemicism's ontological backdrop is far from the conservative picture it is thought to enable. |
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