Open future and modal anti-realism.
Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is f...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 168; no. 2; pp. 417 - 439 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=94666267&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 94666267 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2014 vid: 168 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 94666267 10.1007/s11098-013-0137-3 ppf: 417 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 301KB tig: atl: Open future and modal anti-realism. aug: au: Kodaj, Daniel affil: Central European University, Budapest Hungary su: Modality (Theory of knowledge) Anti-realism Universals (Philosophy) Neoplatonism Spacetime sug: subj: Modality (Theory of knowledge) Anti-realism Universals (Philosophy) Neoplatonism Spacetime keyword: Bivalence Future contingents Indeterminism Modal abstractionism Modal realism Ontic vagueness Open future Supervaluationism Thin red line True future ab: Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness. The kind of metaphysical indeterminacy required for open future is incompatible with the kind of maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. The paper discusses various modal realist responses and argues that they provide ersatz openness only, or they lead to incoherence, or they render the resulting theory inadequate as a theory of modality. The paper also considers various accounts of the open future, including rejection of bivalence, supervaluationism, and the 'thin red line' view (TRL), and claims that a version of (TRL) can avoid the incompatibility problem, but only at the cost of deflating the notion of openness. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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