A Generative System for Intentional Action?
It has been proposed that intentional actions are supplied by a generative system of the sort described by Chomsky for language. In this paper I aim to provide a closer analysis of this claim for the sake of conceptual clarification. To this end, I will first clarify what is involved in the thesis o...
| Published in: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 1; pp. 77 - 86 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Apr2014
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=94725105&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 94725105 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2014 vid: 33 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 94725105 10.1007/s11245-013-9186-7 ppf: 77 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 192KB tig: atl: A Generative System for Intentional Action? aug: au: Mazzone, Marco affil: Dipartimento di Scienze Umane, Università degli Studi di Catania, Piazza Dante 32 95124 Catania Italy su: Intentionality (Philosophy) Broca's area Generative grammar Language & languages Act (Philosophy) sug: subj: Intentionality (Philosophy) Broca's area Generative grammar Language & languages Act (Philosophy) keyword: Action Generative process Intention ab: It has been proposed that intentional actions are supplied by a generative system of the sort described by Chomsky for language. In this paper I aim to provide a closer analysis of this claim for the sake of conceptual clarification. To this end, I will first clarify what is involved in the thesis of a structural analogy between language and action, and then I will consider what kind of evidence there seems to be in favour of the thesis of a neurobiological identity. On this basis, I will subsequently focus on two definitional issues. The first is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, humans may perform an infinite number of possible actions. The second is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, what is at issue is conscious planning of action and therefore controlled processing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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