Reconciling probability theory and coherentism.

Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 191; no. 6; pp. 1075 - 1085
Autor principal: Duddy, Conal
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: National University of Ireland Galway, Galway Ireland
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        Probability theory
        Coherence (Physics)
        Bayesian analysis
        Negation (Logic)
        Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
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          Probability theory
          Coherence (Physics)
          Bayesian analysis
          Negation (Logic)
          Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
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        Bayesian
        Coherence
        Coherentism
        Testimony
        Witness model
      ab: Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.
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    language: English
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