Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea.
This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non-turnover control firms during the period 2001-2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departur...
| Publicado en: | Abacus Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 25 - 56 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2014
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=94833053&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 94833053 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00013072 AUB jtl: Abacus issn: 00013072 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2014 vid: 50 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 94833053 10.1111/abac.12021 ppf: 25 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 191KB tig: atl: Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea. aug: au: Choi, Jong‐Seo Kwak, Young‐Min Choe, Chongwoo affil: College of Business, Pusan National University, South Korea School of Business Administration, University of Ulsan, South Korea Department of Economics, Monash University su: Business turnover Chief executive officers Earnings management Corporate finance Financial performance sug: subj: Business turnover Chief executive officers Earnings management Corporate finance Financial performance keyword: CEO turnover Corporate governance Korea Stock Exchange ab: This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non-turnover control firms during the period 2001-2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of the outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and whether the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the endogeneity of CEO turnover and a potential selection bias using 2 SLS and Heckman's two-stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of his predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Abacus is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Abacus holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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