Louis de La Forge and the ‘Non-Transfer Argument’ for Occasionalism.
In this paper, I investigate Louis de La Forge's argument against body–body causation. His general strategy exploits the impossibility of bodies communicating their movement by transfer of motion. I call this the ‘non-transfer’ argument (NT). NT allows La Forge both to reinterpret continuous creatio...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 22; no. 1; pp. 60 - 81 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jan2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=94885950&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 94885950 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2014 vid: 22 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 94885950 10.1080/09608788.2013.866071 ppf: 60 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 176KB tig: atl: Louis de La Forge and the ‘Non-Transfer Argument’ for Occasionalism. aug: au: Sangiacomo, Andrea affil: University of Groningen su: Mind & body Occasionalism Descartes, René, 1596-1650 De la Forge, Louis Motion Philosophy Seventeenth century sug: subj: Mind & body Occasionalism Descartes, René, 1596-1650 De la Forge, Louis Motion Philosophy Seventeenth century keyword: continuous creation Descartes La Forge mind–body interactionism mind–body interactionism occasionalism ab: In this paper, I investigate Louis de La Forge's argument against body–body causation. His general strategy exploits the impossibility of bodies communicating their movement by transfer of motion. I call this the ‘non-transfer’ argument (NT). NT allows La Forge both to reinterpret continuous creation in an occasionalistic fashion and to support his non-occasionalistic view concerning mind–body union. First, I present how NT emerges in Descartes’ own texts. Second, I show how La Forge recasts it to draw an occasionalistic account of body–body interactions, and I discuss how La Forge supports NT with continuous creation. Third, I conclude by suggesting that this further step of his argument does not undermine his non-occasionalistic account of mind–body union. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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