WHAT HAVE I DONE?

An externalist view of intention is developed on broadly Wittgensteinian grounds, and applied to show that the classic Thomist doctrine of double effect, though it has good uses in casuistry, has also been overused because of the internalism about intention that has generally been presupposed by its...

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Publicado en:Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy no. 38; pp. 86 - 113
Autor principal: Chappell, Timothy
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 2013
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, ca. 1225-1274
        Applied ethics
        Double effect (Ethics)
        Philosophy of mind
        Christian ethics
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          Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, ca. 1225-1274
          Applied ethics
          Double effect (Ethics)
          Philosophy of mind
          Christian ethics
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        double effect
        externalism
        intention
        Thomas Aquinas
        Wittgenstein
      ab: An externalist view of intention is developed on broadly Wittgensteinian grounds, and applied to show that the classic Thomist doctrine of double effect, though it has good uses in casuistry, has also been overused because of the internalism about intention that has generally been presupposed by its users. We need a good criterion of what counts as the content of our intentional actions; I argue, again on Wittgensteinian grounds, that the best criterion comes not from foresight, nor from foresight plus some degree of probability, nor from any metaphysics of "closeness", but simply from our ordinary shared understanding of what counts as doing a given action, and what does not.
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