Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?

In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibri...

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Publicado en:Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 17; no. 2; pp. 237 - 253
Autor principal: Brun, Georg
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2014
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Intuition
        Justification (Ethics)
        Theory of knowledge
        Metaphysics
        Consciousness
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          Intuition
          Justification (Ethics)
          Theory of knowledge
          Metaphysics
          Consciousness
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        Coherentism
        Foundationalism
        Intuitionism
        Justification
        Reflective equilibrium
      ab: In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if the process is successful, be justified. Since the method of reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone.
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