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Replies to Bricker, Divers, and Sullivan.

The author presents a response on the comments of readers Phillip Bricker, John Divers, and Meghan Sullivan on the book "Modal Logic as Metaphysics." He discusses the readers' respective views of Lewis' modal realism, which illustrate the modalist's acceptance of the key necessitist thesis. The auth...

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Publicado en:Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 744 - 765
Autor principal: Williamson, Timothy
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell May2014
Materias:
Realism
Universals (Philosophy)
Semantics (Philosophy)
Modal Logic As Metaphysics (Book)
Sullivan, Meghan
Divers, John
Bricker, Phillip
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Sumario:The author presents a response on the comments of readers Phillip Bricker, John Divers, and Meghan Sullivan on the book "Modal Logic as Metaphysics." He discusses the readers' respective views of Lewis' modal realism, which illustrate the modalist's acceptance of the key necessitist thesis. The author also agrees with Bricker's claim that metaphysical theories are not semantic theories, which come out in the comparison between necessitist and contingentist.