A Psychological Reexamination of the Bertrand Paradox.
The Bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost. In laboratory experiments, this equilibrium is not generally observed. Existing empirical works on Bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models. We fi...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 80; no. 4; pp. 948 - 968 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=95738972&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 95738972 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2014 vid: 80 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 95738972 10.4284/0038-4038-2012.264 ppf: 948 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 13.1MB tig: atl: A Psychological Reexamination of the Bertrand Paradox. aug: au: Fatas, Enrique Haruvy, Ernan Morales, Antonio J. affil: School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, 500 W Campbell Road, SM32, Richardson, TX 75080-3021, USA Department of Economics, University of Malaga, Facultad de Ciencias Economicas, Departamento de Teoria Economica, Plaza El Ejido s/n, 29013 Malaga, Spain su: Economic competition Market equilibrium Direct costing Nash equilibrium Pricing sug: subj: Economic competition Market equilibrium Direct costing Nash equilibrium Pricing ab: The Bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost. In laboratory experiments, this equilibrium is not generally observed. Existing empirical works on Bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models. We find that such models are useful in organizing behavior in early stages of the game, but less so in later stages. We show that a new model, coarse grid Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that subjects discretize the strategy space, explains the data better. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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