Intentional Vagueness.

This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 79; pp. 855 - 900
Autores principales: Blume, Andreas, Board, Oliver
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2014 Supplement 4
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Blume, Andreas
          Board, Oliver
        affil:
          Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson 85721 USA
          New York University School of Law, 40 Washington Square South New York 10012 USA
      su:
        Communications research
        Interpretation (Philosophy)
        Intentionality (Philosophy)
        Vagueness (Philosophy)
        Language & languages
        Message theory (Communication)
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        subj:
          Communications research
          Interpretation (Philosophy)
          Intentionality (Philosophy)
          Vagueness (Philosophy)
          Language & languages
          Message theory (Communication)
      ab: This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare enhancing because it mitigates conflict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability condition intentional vagueness increases with the degree of conflict between sender and receiver.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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