Structural Realism for Secondary Qualities.

This paper outlines and defends a novel position in the color realism debate, namely structural realism. This position is novel in that it dissociates the veridicality of color attributions from the claim that physical objects are themselves colored. Thus, it is realist about color in both the seman...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 3; pp. 481 - 511
Autor principal: Isaac, Alistair
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Isaac, Alistair
        affil: University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia USA
      su:
        Realism
        Quality (Philosophy)
        Epistemics
        Semantics (Philosophy)
        Calibration
        Structural linguistics
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        subj:
          Realism
          Quality (Philosophy)
          Epistemics
          Semantics (Philosophy)
          Calibration
          Structural linguistics
      ab: This paper outlines and defends a novel position in the color realism debate, namely structural realism. This position is novel in that it dissociates the veridicality of color attributions from the claim that physical objects are themselves colored. Thus, it is realist about color in both the semantic and epistemic senses, but not the ontic sense. The generality of this position is demonstrated by applying it to other 'secondary qualities,' including heat, musical pitch, and odor. The basic argument proceeds by analogy with the theory of measurement. I argue that perceptual experiences are analogous to numerical structures in that they are suitable for measurement, but only report measured values after they have been linked to states of a measurement device via calibration. Since the calibration of our sensory apparatus varies with context, it is inappropriate to identify specific experiences with specific properties in the world. Rather, it is structural relations between possible experiences which represent relations between possible external properties, and it is at the level of these structural relationships that veridicality is appropriately assessed.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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