Subjective evaluations with performance feedback.
Firms use subjective performance evaluations to provide employees with both incentives and feedback. This article shows that if an objective measure of performance, however imperfect, is available, subjective evaluations with incentive effects can be sustained even without repeated interaction. Alth...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 45; no. 2; pp. 341 - 370 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=95892010&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 95892010 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Summer2014 vid: 45 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 95892010 10.1111/1756-2171.12054 ppf: 341 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 302KB tig: atl: Subjective evaluations with performance feedback. aug: au: Zábojník, Ján affil: Queen's University su: Psychological feedback Labor incentives Employee reviews Agency theory Production functions (Economic theory) sug: subj: Psychological feedback Labor incentives Employee reviews Agency theory Production functions (Economic theory) ab: Firms use subjective performance evaluations to provide employees with both incentives and feedback. This article shows that if an objective measure of performance, however imperfect, is available, subjective evaluations with incentive effects can be sustained even without repeated interaction. Although full efficiency cannot be achieved in general, it is achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers. When the number of workers is small, a forced distribution is useful only if the objective measure is poor. The model also shows that a leniency bias in evaluations can improve incentives. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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