Causal essentialism and mereological monism.

Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism-the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call 'Mereological...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 169; no. 2; pp. 227 - 256
Autor principal: Segal, Aaron
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=95975301&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 95975301
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318116
        4L8
      jtl: Philosophical Studies
      issn: 00318116
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2014
      vid: 169
      iid: 2
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        95975301
        10.1007/s11098-013-0180-0
      ppf: 227
      ppct: 29
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 368KB
      tig:
        atl: Causal essentialism and mereological monism.
      aug:
        au: Segal, Aaron
        affil: University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame USA
      su:
        Essentialism (Philosophy)
        Monism
        Philosophers
        Whole & parts (Philosophy)
        Philosophy
      sug:
        subj:
          Essentialism (Philosophy)
          Monism
          Philosophers
          Whole & parts (Philosophy)
          Philosophy
      keyword:
        Causal essentialism
        Necessary connections
        Null individual
        Patchwork
        Weak supplementation
      ab: Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism-the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call 'Mereological Monism': that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism does not imply any form of Monism at all. I survey the costs associated with taking these escape routes along with the costs associated with accepting Mereological Monism.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Philosophical Studies
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2014
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N