How to resolve doxastic disagreement.
How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent's epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxast...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 191; no. 11; pp. 2359 - 2382 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=96362207&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 96362207 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2014 vid: 191 iid: 11 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 96362207 10.1007/s11229-014-0431-4 ppf: 2359 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 261KB tig: atl: How to resolve doxastic disagreement. aug: au: Brössel, Peter Eder, Anna-Maria affil: Center for Mind, Brain, and Cognitive Evolution, Ruhr-University Bochum, Konstanz Germany Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Konstanz Germany su: Social epistemology Bayesian analysis Epistemic logic Agent (Philosophy) Conflict of interests Probability theory sug: subj: Social epistemology Bayesian analysis Epistemic logic Agent (Philosophy) Conflict of interests Probability theory keyword: Bayesian epistemology epistemic disagreement probability aggregation social epistemology ab: How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent's epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent's epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer to the question of how to rationally revise one's epistemic state in the light of disagreement. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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