A social epistemology of aesthetics: belief polarization, echo chambers and aesthetic judgement.
How do we form aesthetic judgements? And how should we do so? According to a very prominent tradition in aesthetics it would be wrong to form our aesthetic judgements about a particular object on the basis of anything other than first-hand acquaintance with the object itself (or some very close surr...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 191; no. 11; pp. 2513 - 2529 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=96362210&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 96362210 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2014 vid: 191 iid: 11 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 96362210 10.1007/s11229-014-0437-y ppf: 2513 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 201KB tig: atl: A social epistemology of aesthetics: belief polarization, echo chambers and aesthetic judgement. aug: au: Robson, Jon affil: University of Nottingham, Nottingham UK su: Social epistemology Aesthetics Belief & doubt Polarization (Social sciences) Judgment (Psychology) Testimony (Theory of knowledge) sug: subj: Social epistemology Aesthetics Belief & doubt Polarization (Social sciences) Judgment (Psychology) Testimony (Theory of knowledge) keyword: Aesthetic judgement Belief polarization Echo chamber Epistemology Testimony ab: How do we form aesthetic judgements? And how should we do so? According to a very prominent tradition in aesthetics it would be wrong to form our aesthetic judgements about a particular object on the basis of anything other than first-hand acquaintance with the object itself (or some very close surrogate) and, in particular, it would be wrong to form such judgements merely on the basis of testimony. Further this tradition presupposes that our actual practice of forming aesthetic judgements typically meets, or at least approximates, this ideal. In this paper I target this descriptive claim and argue-by appeal to some empirical work concerning belief polarization and echo chambers in aesthetics-that our actual practice of forming aesthetic judgements is heavily dependent on social sources such as testimony. I then briefly consider what normative implications this descriptive claim may have. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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