Minimal Model Explanations.
This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, mechanical, difference-making, and so on, strategies prominent in the philosophical literature. We contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of these models is not that they have certain fe...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 81; no. 3; pp. 349 - 377 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=96705260&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 96705260 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2014 vid: 81 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 96705260 10.1086/676677 ppf: 349 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Minimal Model Explanations. aug: au: Batterman, Robert W. Rice, Collin C. su: Scientific models Philosophical literature Behavior Philosophy Humanities sug: subj: Scientific models Philosophical literature Behavior Philosophy Humanities ab: This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, mechanical, difference-making, and so on, strategies prominent in the philosophical literature. We contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of these models is not that they have certain features in common with real systems. Rather, the models are explanatory because of a story about why a class of systems will all display the same large-scale behavior because the details that distinguish them are irrelevant. This story explains patterns across extremely diverse systems and shows how minimal models can be used to understand real systems. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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