Explaining representation: a reply to Matthen.

The author offers a response to an article "How to Think about Mental Content" by Mohan Matthen, citing the failure of the researcher to understand the position of mentality though he often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He argues on the particular construal of the role of represen...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 170; no. 1; pp. 137 - 143
Autor principal: Egan, Frances
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2014
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Egan, Frances
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick USA
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        Cognition
        Content (Psychology)
        Argument
        Representation (Philosophy)
        Matthen, Mohan
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          Cognition
          Content (Psychology)
          Argument
          Representation (Philosophy)
          Matthen, Mohan
      ab: The author offers a response to an article "How to Think about Mental Content" by Mohan Matthen, citing the failure of the researcher to understand the position of mentality though he often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He argues on the particular construal of the role of representational content in computational models of cognition. He also cites that view of Matthen of computation is not sensitive to actual practice of representationalism.
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