Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.

In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive mo...

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Publicado en:Ethics Vol. 124; no. 4; pp. 695 - 727
Autor principal: Greene, Joshua D.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press Jul2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.
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        au: Greene, Joshua D.
        affil: Harvard University
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        Ethics
        Values (Ethics)
        Moral judgment
        Psychology
        Philosophy of mind
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          Ethics
          Values (Ethics)
          Moral judgment
          Psychology
          Philosophy of mind
      ab: In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.
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    language: English
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