Can good science be logically inconsistent?
Some philosophers have recently argued that contrary to the traditional view, good scientific theories can in fact be logically inconsistent. The literature is now full of case-studies that are taken to support this claim. I will argue however that as of yet no-one has managed to articulate a philos...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 191; no. 13; pp. 3009 - 3027 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Sep2014
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Some philosophers have recently argued that contrary to the traditional view, good scientific theories can in fact be logically inconsistent. The literature is now full of case-studies that are taken to support this claim. I will argue however that as of yet no-one has managed to articulate a philosophically interesting view about the role of logically inconsistent theories in science that genuinely goes against tradition, is plausibly true, and is supported by any of the case studies usually given. |
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