Wherever You Go, There You Are: On Individuative Subjective Phenomenology.
That experience requires a subject is all but uncontroversial. It is surprising, then, that contemporary philosophers of mind generally focus on experiences at the expense of subjects. Herein, I argue that beyond the qualitative character (or "what-it's-like-ness") of phenomenology, there is a discr...
| Publicado en: | Essays in Philosophy Vol. 15; no. 2; pp. 249 - 266 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Essays in Philosophy
Jul2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=97312366&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 97312366 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15260569 1CNX jtl: Essays in Philosophy issn: 15260569 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2014 vid: 15 iid: 2 pid: 24375 pub: Essays in Philosophy artinfo: ui: 97312366 10.7710/1526-0569.1506 ppf: 249 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 90KB tig: atl: Wherever You Go, There You Are: On Individuative Subjective Phenomenology. aug: au: Turausky, Keith E. affil: University of Texas, Austin su: Phenomenology Existentialism Phenomenological psychology Intentionality (Philosophy) Psychologism sug: subj: Phenomenology Existentialism Phenomenological psychology Intentionality (Philosophy) Psychologism ab: That experience requires a subject is all but uncontroversial. It is surprising, then, that contemporary philosophers of mind generally focus on experiences at the expense of subjects. Herein, I argue that beyond the qualitative character (or "what-it's-like-ness") of phenomenology, there is a discrete further fact--the subjective character (or "for-me-ness") of phenomenology--that calls out for explanation. Similar views have recently been endorsed by both Zahavi and Kriegel, but a comparison of the ways they have framed the issue suggests there are two discrete questions afoot: (1) in virtue of what does subjective phenomenology exist whatsoever, and (2) in virtue of what might one's subjective phenomenology differ from that of one's perfect duplicate? The second question--that of individuative subjective phenomenology--is my primary concern, and its answer seems to me to require the invocation of haecceities: non-qualitative, non-duplicable properties that uniquely individuate objects (and, in this case, subjects). In other words, I suggest that the property of being the very subject that one is enters essentially into the phenomenological character of all one's experiences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Essays in Philosophy is the property of Essays in Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Essays in Philosophy holder: Essays in Philosophy dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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