Physics and the Human Face of Causation.

Many contemporary philosophers of physics (and philosophers of science more generally) follow Bertrand Russell in arguing that there is no room for causal notions in physics. Causation, as James Woodward has put it, has a 'human face', which makes causal notions sit ill with fundamental theories of...

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Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 407 - 420
Autor principal: Frisch, Mathias
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Oct2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Causation (Philosophy)
        Causal models
        Scientific observation
        Physics -- Methodology
        Space-time symmetries
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          Causation (Philosophy)
          Causal models
          Scientific observation
          Physics -- Methodology
          Space-time symmetries
      keyword:
        Causation
        Models
        Physics
        Scientific representations
        Time-asymmetry
      ab: Many contemporary philosophers of physics (and philosophers of science more generally) follow Bertrand Russell in arguing that there is no room for causal notions in physics. Causation, as James Woodward has put it, has a 'human face', which makes causal notions sit ill with fundamental theories of physics. In this paper I examine a range of anti-causal arguments and show that the human face of causation is the face of scientific representations much more generally. Physics, like other sciences, is deeply permeated with causal reasoning.
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    language: English
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