ARE WE SIMS? HOW COMPUTER SIMULATIONS REPRESENT AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE SIMULATION ARGUMENT.
N. Bostrom's simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we likely live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analo...
| Publicado en: | Monist Vol. 97; no. 3; pp. 399 - 418 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=98124989&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 98124989 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00269662 MST jtl: Monist issn: 00269662 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2014 vid: 97 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 98124989 ppf: 399 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 6.7MB tig: atl: ARE WE SIMS? HOW COMPUTER SIMULATIONS REPRESENT AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE SIMULATION ARGUMENT. aug: au: Beisbart, Claus affil: University of Bern su: Computer simulation Realism Analogy Brain Philosophy sug: subj: Computer simulation Realism Analogy Brain Philosophy ab: N. Bostrom's simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we likely live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the computer hardware does provide a material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the simulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hardware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather than, say, galaxies. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Hegeler Institute. item: Monist holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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