Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment.
Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 58; no. 3; pp. 433 - 448 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Sep2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=98285770&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 98285770 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2014 vid: 58 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 98285770 10.1111/isqu.12106 ppf: 433 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 98285770 tig: atl: Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment. aug: au: Jensen, Nathan M. Malesky, Edmund Medina, Mariana Ozdemir, Ugur affil: Washington University in St. Louis Duke University Iowa State University Istanbul Bilgi University su: United States Economic globalization Economic policy Tax incentives U.S. states politics & government United States governors Economics & politics U.S. states sug: subj: Economic globalization Economic policy United States Executive Offices Tax incentives U.S. states politics & government United States governors Economics & politics U.S. states ab: Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the 'competition' for capital can be politically beneficial to incumbent politicians. Building off work on electoral pandering, we argue that incentives allow politicians to take credit for firms' investment decisions. We test the empirical implications of this theory using a nationwide Internet survey, which employs a randomized experiment to test how voters evaluate the performance of incumbent US governors. Our findings illustrate a critical political benefit of offering such incentives. Politicians can use these incentives to take credit for investment flowing into their districts and to minimize the political fallout when investors choose to locate elsewhere. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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