Malament-Hogarth Machines and Tait's Axiomatic Conception of Mathematics.

In this paper I will argue that Tait's axiomatic conception of mathematics implies that it is in principle impossible to be justified in believing a mathematical statement without being justified in believing that statement to be provable. I will then show that there are possible courses of experien...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 4; pp. 893 - 908
Autor principal: Berry, Sharon
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2014
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Berry, Sharon
        affil: Harvard University, 209a Emerson Hall Cambridge 02138 USA
      su:
        Mathematical logic
        Mathematics research
        Mathematical proofs
        Philosophical research
        Mathematical analysis
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          Mathematical logic
          Mathematics research
          Mathematical proofs
          Philosophical research
          Mathematical analysis
      ab: In this paper I will argue that Tait's axiomatic conception of mathematics implies that it is in principle impossible to be justified in believing a mathematical statement without being justified in believing that statement to be provable. I will then show that there are possible courses of experience which would justify acceptance of a mathematical statement without justifying belief that this statement is provable.
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    language: English
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