Demoralizing causation.
There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factor...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 171; no. 2; pp. 251 - 278 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Nov2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=98519254&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 98519254 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2014 vid: 171 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 98519254 10.1007/s11098-013-0266-8 ppf: 251 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 380KB tig: atl: Demoralizing causation. aug: au: Danks, David Rose, David Machery, Edouard affil: Departments of Philosophy & Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, 135 Baker Hall Pittsburgh 15213 USA Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick USA Department of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh USA su: Causation (Philosophy) Moral judgment Reasoning Cognition Philosophical research sug: subj: Causation (Philosophy) Moral judgment Reasoning Cognition Philosophical research keyword: Causal judgment Causal reasoning Causation Normative considerations ab: There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a particular type of causal cognition; the extant data do not warrant any wide-ranging conclusions about the pervasiveness of normative considerations in causal cognition. Of course, almost all empirical investigations involve some manner of ampliative inference, and so we provide novel empirical results demonstrating that there are types of causal cognition that do not seem to be influenced by moral considerations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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