The predictive mind and chess-playing: A reply to Shand.
In a recent Analysis piece, John Shand (2014) argues that the Predictive Theory of Mind provides a unique explanation for why one cannot play chess against oneself. On the basis of this purported explanatory power, Shand concludes that we have an extra reason to believe that PTM is correct. In this...
| Publicado en: | Analysis Vol. 74; no. 4; pp. 603 - 609 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In a recent Analysis piece, John Shand (2014) argues that the Predictive Theory of Mind provides a unique explanation for why one cannot play chess against oneself. On the basis of this purported explanatory power, Shand concludes that we have an extra reason to believe that PTM is correct. In this reply, we first rectify the claim that one cannot play chess against oneself; then we move on to argue that even if this were the case, Shand’s argument does not give extra weight to the Predictive Theory of Mind. |
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