When Critics Disagree: Prospects for Realism in Aesthetics.
I investigate whether a reconstructed Humean theory of appreciation can secure the objectivity of aesthetic judgement. Examining a current debate about aesthetic realism, I argue that it stalls out at a verificationist impasse. I suggest a resolution that broadens our conception of aesthetic qualiti...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 64; no. 257; pp. 590 - 619 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I investigate whether a reconstructed Humean theory of appreciation can secure the objectivity of aesthetic judgement. Examining a current debate about aesthetic realism, I argue that it stalls out at a verificationist impasse. I suggest a resolution that broadens our conception of aesthetic qualities and invokes a notion of critic clusters to mark the agreement of ideal critics. Taking into account the suitability of critics to the works they judge as well as some complications of the test of time increases support for a qualified form of aesthetic realism. |
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