The Ontological Status of Embryos: A Reply to Jason Morris.

In various places we have defended the position that a new human organism, that is, an individual member of the human species, comes to be at fertilization, the union of the spermatozoon and the oocyte. This individual organism, during the ordinary course of embryological development, remains the sa...

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Publicado en:Journal of Medicine & Philosophy Vol. 39; no. 5; pp. 483 - 505
Autores principales: Lee, Patrick, Tollefsen, Christopher, George, Robert P.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Oct2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Ontological Status of Embryos: A Reply to Jason Morris.
      aug:
        au:
          Lee, Patrick
          Tollefsen, Christopher
          George, Robert P.
        affil:
          Franciscan University of Steubenville , Steubenville, Ohio , USA
          University of Southern Carolina , Columbia, South Carolina , USA
          Princeton University , Princeton, New Jersey , USA
      su:
        Embryology
        Conception
        Spermatozoa
        Chimerism
        Reproductive technology
        Stem cell transplantation ethics
        Ethics
      sug:
        subj:
          Embryology
          Conception
          Spermatozoa
          Chimerism
          Reproductive technology
          Stem cell transplantation ethics
          Ethics
      keyword:
        embryo
        embryogenesis
        induced pluripotent stem cells
        personhood
        substance ontology
        substantial change
      ab: In various places we have defended the position that a new human organism, that is, an individual member of the human species, comes to be at fertilization, the union of the spermatozoon and the oocyte. This individual organism, during the ordinary course of embryological development, remains the same individual and does not undergo any further substantial change, unless monozygotic twinning, or some form of chimerism occurs. Recently, in this Journal Jason Morris has challenged our position, claiming that recent findings in reproductive and stem cell biology have falsified our view. He objects to our claim that a discernible substantial change occurs at conception, giving rise to the existence of a new individual of the human species. In addition, he objects to our claim that the embryo is an individual, a unified whole that persists through various changes, and thus something other than a mere aggregate of cells. Morris raises a number of objections to these claims. However, we will show that his arguments overlook key data and confuse biological, metaphysical, and ethical questions. As a result, his attempts to rebut our arguments fail.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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