Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis.

Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care consumption. We pro...

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Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 45; no. 4; pp. 747 - 764
Autores principales:	Bajari, Patrick, Dalton, Christina, Hong, Han, Khwaja, Ahmed
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Winter2014
Materias:	Medical care costs Empirical research Structural models Moral hazard Adverse selection (Insurance)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost