Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit collusion? Inference on conduct parameters in the airline industry.
We provide empirical evidence that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines using a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modelled as functions of multimarket contact. We find (i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in sett...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 45; no. 4; pp. 764 - 792 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=99108148&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 99108148 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Winter2014 vid: 45 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 99108148 10.1111/1756-2171.12070 ppf: 764 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit collusion? Inference on conduct parameters in the airline industry. aug: au: Ciliberto, Federico Williams, Jonathan W. affil: University of Virginia University of Georgia su: Consumer behavior Competitor orientation Direct costing Cost estimates Airline industry sug: subj: Consumer behavior Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation Scheduled air transportation Competitor orientation Direct costing Cost estimates Airline industry ab: We provide empirical evidence that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines using a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modelled as functions of multimarket contact. We find (i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, whereas carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; (ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on equilibrium fares; (iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; (iv) assuming firms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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