The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.

Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism's resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 171; no. 3; pp. 399 - 444
Autores principales: Cuneo, Terence, Shafer-Landau, Russ
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=99124460&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 99124460
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318116
        4L8
      jtl: Philosophical Studies
      issn: 00318116
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Dec2014
      vid: 171
      iid: 3
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        99124460
        10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5
      ppf: 399
      ppct: 45
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 387KB
      tig:
        atl: The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.
      aug:
        au:
          Cuneo, Terence
          Shafer-Landau, Russ
        affil:
          Philosophy Department, University of Vermont, Burlington USA
          Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison USA
      su:
        Moral realism
        Realism
        Naturalists
        Philosophers
        Dworkin, Ronald, 1931-2013
      sug:
        subj:
          Moral realism
          Realism
          Naturalists
          Philosophers
          Dworkin, Ronald, 1931-2013
      keyword:
        Conceptual truth
        Debunking
        Evolutionary
        Moral disagreement
        Nonnaturalism
        Supervenience
      ab: Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism's resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds similar to our own. By committing themselves to true propositions of these sorts, nonnaturalists can fashion a view that is highly attractive in its own right, and resistant to the most prominent objections that have been pressed against it.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Philosophical Studies
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2014
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N