Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.
It is well known that classical, aka 'sharp', Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called 'imprecise' mo...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 6; pp. 1273 - 1287 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=99217419&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 99217419 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2014 vid: 79 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 99217419 10.1007/s10670-013-9597-2 ppf: 1273 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 312KB tig: atl: Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp. aug: au: Chandler, Jake affil: Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 80539 Munich Germany su: Probability theory Bayesian analysis Belief & doubt Decision making Elga, Adam sug: subj: Probability theory Bayesian analysis Belief & doubt Decision making Elga, Adam ab: It is well known that classical, aka 'sharp', Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called 'imprecise' models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out by the sharp model but not by any promising incarnation of its imprecise counterpart. After first pointing out that Elga has fallen short of establishing that his principle is indeed uniquely borne out by the sharp model, I cast aspersions on its plausibility. I show that a slight weakening of the principle is satisfied by at least one, but interestingly not all, varieties of the imprecise model and point out that Elga has failed to motivate his stronger commitment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2014. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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