Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.

It is well known that classical, aka 'sharp', Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called 'imprecise' mo...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 6; pp. 1273 - 1287
Autor principal: Chandler, Jake
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2014
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Chandler, Jake
        affil: Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 80539 Munich Germany
      su:
        Probability theory
        Bayesian analysis
        Belief & doubt
        Decision making
        Elga, Adam
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        subj:
          Probability theory
          Bayesian analysis
          Belief & doubt
          Decision making
          Elga, Adam
      ab: It is well known that classical, aka 'sharp', Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called 'imprecise' models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out by the sharp model but not by any promising incarnation of its imprecise counterpart. After first pointing out that Elga has fallen short of establishing that his principle is indeed uniquely borne out by the sharp model, I cast aspersions on its plausibility. I show that a slight weakening of the principle is satisfied by at least one, but interestingly not all, varieties of the imprecise model and point out that Elga has failed to motivate his stronger commitment.
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    language: English
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