Uncertainty, Learning, and the 'Problem' of Dilation.
Imprecise probabilism-which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions-apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 6; pp. 1287 - 1304 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2014
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Imprecise probabilism-which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions-apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation. |
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