The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.
Crazyism about X is the view that something it would be crazy to believe must be among the core truths about X. In this essay, I argue that crazyism is true of the metaphysics of mind. A position is ‘crazy’ in the intended sense if it is contrary to common sense and we are not epistemically compelle...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 92; no. 4; pp. 665 - 683 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=99283038&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 99283038 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2014 vid: 92 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 99283038 10.1080/00048402.2014.910675 ppf: 665 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 143KB tig: atl: The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. aug: au: Schwitzgebel, Eric affil: University of California at Riverside su: Metaphysics Mind & body Epistemics Metaphysical cosmology Common sense sug: subj: Metaphysics Mind & body Epistemics Metaphysical cosmology Common sense keyword: common sense consciousness dualism idealism materialism metaphilosophy metaphysics ab: Crazyism about X is the view that something it would be crazy to believe must be among the core truths about X. In this essay, I argue that crazyism is true of the metaphysics of mind. A position is ‘crazy’ in the intended sense if it is contrary to common sense and we are not epistemically compelled to believe it. Crazyism can be treated as the conjunction of two sub-theses: (1) that something contrary to common sense must be true and (2) that whatever that true thing is, we are not epistemically compelled to believe it. I defend the first thesis on grounds of the probable incoherence of folk metaphysics, from which it follows that any fully fleshed-out metaphysics will inevitably conflict with some piece of that incoherent story. I defend the second thesis on three grounds: peer disagreement, lack of a compelling method for resolving metaphysical disputes about the mind, and the dubiousness of the general cosmological claims with which metaphysical claims about the mind are entangled. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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