THE IMPACT OF A PUBLIC OPTION IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET.
We develop a game-theoretical framework to examine the implications of the introduction of a nonprofit 'public option' in the U.S. health insurance market. In this model, heterogeneous consumers have to choose between two competing insurance plans. One plan is offered by a profit-maximizing private...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 53; no. 1; pp. 508 - 522 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=99542680&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 99542680 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2015 vid: 53 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 99542680 10.1111/ecin.12132 ppf: 508 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 561KB tig: atl: THE IMPACT OF A PUBLIC OPTION IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET. aug: au: Barbos, Andrei Deng, Yi affil: Department of Economics, University of South Florida, Tampa FL 33620 Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington DC 20580 su: United States Health insurance Public opinion Consumer attitudes Health insurance -- Social aspects Equilibrium sug: subj: Health insurance Public opinion Consumer attitudes Health insurance -- Social aspects United States Direct group life, health and medical insurance carriers Direct individual life, health and medical insurance carriers Equilibrium ab: We develop a game-theoretical framework to examine the implications of the introduction of a nonprofit 'public option' in the U.S. health insurance market. In this model, heterogeneous consumers have to choose between two competing insurance plans. One plan is offered by a profit-maximizing private insurer; the other by social-welfare-maximizing public option. In equilibrium, the distinct objectives of the two insurers induce adverse selection in consumer choice: the public option covers the less healthy consumers, yielding the more profitable segment of market to the private insurer. However, our empirical results suggest that both insurers will capture significant parts of the health insurance market. ( JEL I11, L10, L21, L32) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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