Explanation as Condition Satisfaction.

It is shown that three common conditions for scientific explanations are violated by a widely used class of domain-independent explanations. These explanations can accommodate both complex and noncomplex systems and do not require the use of detailed models of system-specific processes for their eff...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 81; no. 5; pp. 1103 - 1117
Autor principal: Humphreys, Paul
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Humphreys, Paul
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        Philosophy of science
        Probability theory
        Gaussian function
        Gaussian processes
        Power law (Mathematics)
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          Philosophy of science
          Probability theory
          Gaussian function
          Gaussian processes
          Power law (Mathematics)
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