Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies.
Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign poli...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 58; no. 4; pp. 729 - 741 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2014
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy. |
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