| Sumario: | This paper discusses conditional probability $$P(A{\vert }B)$$ , or the probability of A given B. When $$P(B)>0$$ , the ratio formula determines $$P(A {\vert } B)$$ . When $$P(B)=0$$ , the ratio formula breaks down. The Borel-Kolmogorov paradox suggests that conditional probabilities in such cases are indeterminate or ill-posed. To analyze the paradox, I explore the relation between probability and intensionality. I argue that the paradox is a Frege case, similar to those that arise in many probabilistic and non-probabilistic contexts. The paradox vividly illustrates how an agent's way of representing an entity can rationally influence her credal assignments. I deploy my analysis to defend Kolmogorov's relativistic treatment of conditional probability.
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