Some epistemological ramifications of the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox.
This paper discusses conditional probability $$P(A{\vert }B)$$ , or the probability of A given B. When $$P(B)>0$$ , the ratio formula determines $$P(A {\vert } B)$$ . When $$P(B)=0$$ , the ratio formula breaks down. The Borel-Kolmogorov paradox suggests that conditional probabilities in such cases a...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 192; no. 3; pp. 735 - 768 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=102270572&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 102270572 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2015 vid: 192 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 102270572 10.1007/s11229-014-0586-z ppf: 735 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Some epistemological ramifications of the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox. aug: au: Rescorla, Michael affil: Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara 93106 USA su: Paradox Semantics (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Probability learning Definition (Logic) Language & languages sug: subj: Paradox Semantics (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Probability learning Definition (Logic) Language & languages ab: This paper discusses conditional probability $$P(A{\vert }B)$$ , or the probability of A given B. When $$P(B)>0$$ , the ratio formula determines $$P(A {\vert } B)$$ . When $$P(B)=0$$ , the ratio formula breaks down. The Borel-Kolmogorov paradox suggests that conditional probabilities in such cases are indeterminate or ill-posed. To analyze the paradox, I explore the relation between probability and intensionality. I argue that the paradox is a Frege case, similar to those that arise in many probabilistic and non-probabilistic contexts. The paradox vividly illustrates how an agent's way of representing an entity can rationally influence her credal assignments. I deploy my analysis to defend Kolmogorov's relativistic treatment of conditional probability. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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