Group Minds and Explanatory Simplicity.
This paper explores the claim that explanation of a group's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than...
| Publicado en: | Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 76; pp. 3 - 20 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
May2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This paper explores the claim that explanation of a group's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than group-level explanation. In this paper, we consider three different simplicity metrics. We argue that on none of those metrics does individual-level explanation achieve greater simplicity than a group-level alternative. We conclude that an argument against group minds should not lay weight on concerns of explanatory simplicity. |
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