Group Minds and Explanatory Simplicity.

This paper explores the claim that explanation of a group's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 76; pp. 3 - 20
Autores principales: Sprevak, Mark, Statham, David
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press May2015
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      aug:
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          Sprevak, Mark
          Statham, David
        affil: University of Edinburgh
      su:
        Simplicity (Philosophy)
        Rupert, Robert
        Invocation
        Cognition
        Computer operating systems
      sug:
        subj:
          Simplicity (Philosophy)
          Rupert, Robert
          Invocation
          Cognition
          Computer operating systems
      ab: This paper explores the claim that explanation of a group's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than group-level explanation. In this paper, we consider three different simplicity metrics. We argue that on none of those metrics does individual-level explanation achieve greater simplicity than a group-level alternative. We conclude that an argument against group minds should not lay weight on concerns of explanatory simplicity.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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