Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face.
This paper examines endogenous choice of firm's strategic variables-i.e. price or quantity contract-in a duopoly in which the demand functions that they face are asymmetric in managerial delegation case with separation between ownership and management. We show that when the degree of asymmetry betwe...
| Published in: | Manchester School (1463-6786) Vol. 83; no. 5; pp. 546 - 568 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2015
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=108394019&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 108394019 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 14636786 MSE jtl: Manchester School (1463-6786) issn: 14636786 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2015 vid: 83 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 108394019 10.1111/manc.12073 ppf: 546 ppct: 22 formats: tig: atl: Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face. aug: au: Nakamura, Yasuhiko affil: College of Economics, Nihon University su: Business enterprises Industrial organization (Economic theory) Duopolies Demand function Business planning sug: subj: Business enterprises Industrial organization (Economic theory) Duopolies Demand function Business planning ab: This paper examines endogenous choice of firm's strategic variables-i.e. price or quantity contract-in a duopoly in which the demand functions that they face are asymmetric in managerial delegation case with separation between ownership and management. We show that when the degree of asymmetry between the demand functions that the two firms face is low, price and quantity competitions are observed in the equilibrium, whereas when the degree of such asymmetry is high, the two types of market structures in which the strategic variables selected by the two owners are different from each other are observed in the equilibrium. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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