Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face.

This paper examines endogenous choice of firm's strategic variables-i.e. price or quantity contract-in a duopoly in which the demand functions that they face are asymmetric in managerial delegation case with separation between ownership and management. We show that when the degree of asymmetry betwe...

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Publicado en:	Manchester School (1463-6786) Vol. 83; no. 5; pp. 546 - 568
Autor principal:	Nakamura, Yasuhiko
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Sep2015
Materias:	Business enterprises Industrial organization (Economic theory) Duopolies Demand function Business planning
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost